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This article seeks to critique the Law Commission consultation paper on Reforming Misconduct 
in Public Office.1 This project has been a major undertaking as the offence of misconduct in 
public office (MIPO) covers a wide range of circumstances. The consultation paper is extremely 
detailed and, in common with other papers, is academically rigorous. The paper was preceded by 
an issues paper,2 which set out the Commission’s initial thinking. The greatest success of the 
issues paper appears to be that it provoked additional research. Whilst the issues paper contained 
a detailed appendix setting out recent cases, the responses to the issues paper highlighted other 
examples of how it was being used.3 The consultation paper puts forward ideas as to how MIPO 
could be reformed, with the intention of making it clearer and more certain in its application.  
 
MISCONDUCT IN PUBLIC OFFICE 
This article does not seek to provide a detailed analysis of the history of the offence, partly 
because the Law Commission does this so well. In the issues paper an appendix was included 
that provided a comprehensive and analytical history of the offence.4 This is to be commended 
and is of very high quality. Its inclusion is particularly notable because there is a relative scarcity 
of academic literature on this crime.5  
 
Misconduct in public office (MIPO) is an ancient offence6 and whilst it went through a fallow 
period when it was rarely used, it has enjoyed a renaissance in the 21st Century. It is perhaps most 
recently famous, or infamous, due to its use as part of Operation Elveden, the investigation into 
illegal payments to public officials for the disclosure of confidential information. MIPO was used 
in Operation Elveden both as a substantive offence7 against principals, but also as part of inchoate 
and secondary liability. The latter was particularly controversial as it targeted journalists8 and 
ultimately all but one journalist was acquitted.9 
 
It has been noted that there are ‘a great variety of circumstances in which the offence of [MIPO] 
may be charged’.10 It is one of the broadest crimes in that it encapsulates a wide-range of people 
who are classified as office-holders, and behaviour that can constitute misconduct. The leading 
(modern) statement of the offence is set out by the Court of Appeal in Attorney-General’s Reference 
(No 3 of 2003)11 where it was held that the key elements of the offence are: 
                                                 
1  Law Commission Consultation Paper No 229. (Hereafter ‘Consultation Paper’).  
2  ‘Misconduct in Public Office Issues Paper 1: The Current Law’ (published 20 January 2016). (Hereafter ‘Issues 
Paper’)  
3  See chapter 2 of the consultation paper for an explanation of responses. 
4  Appendix A, Issues Paper. 
5  That said, some of the more notable pieces include S. Parsons ‘Misconduct in a public office – should it still be 
prosecuted?’ (2012) 76 Journal of Criminal Law 179-185; D. Lusty ‘Revival of the Common Law Offence of 
Misconduct in Public Office’ (2014) 38 Criminal Law Journal 337-363 and a short note by Spencer: J. Spencer 
‘Police behaving badly – the abuse of misconduct in office’ (2010) 69 Cambridge Law Journal 423-425. 
6  Issues Paper., Appendix 1. See also R v Chapman et al [2015] EWCA Crim 539 where Lord Thomas CJ states that 
the offence dates back to the thirteenth century (at [17]). 
7  Where, in particular, police officers and prison officers were convicted of the offence (see Appendix D of the 
Issues Paper for a useful summary of this).  
8  They were charged with conspiracy to commit MIPO (s.1, Criminal Law Act 1977). 
9  One journalist was convicted but had their conviction quashed (R v France [2016] EWCA Crim 1588) and one 
(Dan Evans, a former journalist of the Mirror and News of the World) pleaded guilty and received a suspended 
sentence of imprisonment. 
10  Attorney-General’s Reference (No 3 of 2003) [2004] EWCA Crim 868 at [54]. 




1. a public officer acts as such; 
2. wilfully neglects to perform his duty and/or wilfully misconducts himself; 
3. to such a degree as to amount to an abuse of the public’s trust in the office holder, and 
4. without reasonable excuse or justification. 
 
Little will be said about many of these elements at this point as they constitute the principal 
arguments in the consultation paper and, therefore, this article. However, it’s worth pausing on 
the second element, as this explains its breadth. Whilst few would argue that neglecting duty is 
deserving of punishment – with the leading exemplar being R v Dytham12 where a police officer 
on duty watched, and failed to intervene, when a person was attacked – the second form ‘wilful 
misconduct’ could mean almost anything. It has been used in contexts that would perhaps be 
understandable, for example the disclosure of confidential information as in Operation Elveden. 
However, MIPO has also been used for other forms of misconduct. For example, in R v W13 a 
police officer was charged with MIPO in respect of misusing a police-issued credit card. This 
does not obviously relate to his role as a police officer (as civilian staff are also issued with 
corporate credit cards in many companies or institutions, including the police). It is worth noting 
that there is nothing in law that requires the misconduct to be criminal in its own right. The 
offence merely requires wrongful conduct, so long as the other elements (particularly the degree 
to which it abuses the public’s trust) are met. 
 
The Law Commission notes a number of problems with the offence as currently understood: 
 
 The definition of ‘public office’ is vague. 
 Too many people are arguably caught by the definition ‘public office’. 
 Too many forms of behaviour are included within the offence. 
 It is unfair if conduct is criminalised in a particular way because D is a public officer, but 
not if D was a private citizen. 
 
It is these broad criticisms that the consultation paper seeks to address, including through the 
suggestion of introducing new offences. It should be noted that the Law Commission canvasses 
the possibility that MIPO should be abolished without replacement,14 but it ultimately does not 
propose this.15 For the reasons set out below, it is agreed that there is a need for some form of 
MIPO and therefore no more shall be said of this option. 
 
DEFINITION OF PUBLIC OFFICE 
Perhaps the key criticism of MIPO concerns the definition of ‘public office’. This is partly 
because contrary to the name of the offence, it is very clear that it does not merely apply to those 
who hold a public office (for example, civil servants, police officers, judges etc) but also to 
employees. This dates back at least to the civil case of Henly v Lyme Corporation16 where it was said 
‘…everyone who is appointed to discharge a public duty and receives a compensation in 
                                                 
12  [1979] QB 722. 
13  [2010] EWCA Crim 372. 
14  Consultation Paper, p.11. 
15  Indeed, it is noted that nobody, in the response to the issues paper, called for the complete abolition of the 
offence. 
16  (1828) 5 Bing NC 91. 
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whatever shape…is constituted a public officer’. Thus, in contemporary usage, this has meant 
that whilst some office holders have been prosecuted, so have relatively low-level employees.17 
 
One criticism advanced is that the number of categories of people who can be subject to MIPO 
means that it is unclear who is caught and who is not. The Law Commission note that this 
means that the offence could be considered vague, potentially breaching Article 7 of the 
ECHR.18 This is an often-cited ‘problem’ of common-law offences19 but it is one that the courts 
rarely uphold. Whilst the Law Commission note that Article 7 was raised in one case,20 the Court 
of Appeal has specifically rejected the argument that MIPO breaches Article 7.21 
 
A stronger argument for requiring greater certainty is that the current definition of ‘public office’ 
leads to inconsistencies of application. Sometimes the reason for this is obvious, but in other 
cases there is merely an appearance of inconsistency, but the application is correct. A classic 
example of the former is illustrated by the prosecution of Bishop Peter Ball, the former Bishop 
of Gloucester. Ball pleaded guilty to two counts of indecent assault and one count of misconduct 
in public office, the latter being an all-encompassing charge relating to persistent sexual abuse 
and its covering up. The trial judge (Wilkie J) held that a bishop of the Church of England held 
an ‘office’ because of the constitutional position of the Church of England. When being 
sentenced, the judge noted that much of the conduct was, in law, consensual but was 
undoubtedly an abuse of office.22 This is something worth pausing on. Whilst Ball was an office-
holder, a bishop in the Roman Catholic Church would not be and nor would an (Anglican) 
bishop in Wales or Scotland. It is difficult to reconcile this purely on the basis of the ancient 
establishment of the Church of England. 
 
The second category where there is an appearance of inconsistency can be seen where there 
appears to be inconsistencies as to who is, or is not, within the remit of MIPO. Police officers 
are obvious examples of those who are covered by the offence, but so are many local 
government employees whereas medical professionals are not.23  Without an understanding of 
the offence it may be thought that this is inconsistent. A doctor, nurse or paramedic receives 
money from the public purse. Would the public not consider them to be examples of those who 
are employed by the State to look after the public? Yet the courts do not consider them to be 
public office holders, partly because they do not owe a general duty to the public.24 
 
It is unnecessary to consider in depth the current definition of ‘public office’, because it is clear 
that the Law Commission has demonstrated a need to alter the definition. The Commission 
considers a number of alternatives but ultimately decides on two. It argues a person should be 
considered to be in public office if: 
 
1. they are in a position involving a public function exercised pursuant to a state or public 
power, or 
                                                 
17  For example, in R v McClear (2014, Belfast CC, unreported) a council CCTV operator was convicted of MIPO. 
18  Consultation Paper, p.18 citing R v Mitchell [2014] EWCA Crim 318. 
19  For example, public nuisance (R v Rimmington [2005] UKHL 63) and conspiracy to defraud (R v H [2015] 
EWCA Crim 46 doubting the first-instance decision of R v Evans [2014] 1 WLR 2817). 
20  Consultation Paper, p.112, citing R v Mitchell [2014] EWCA Crim 318. 
21  R v Norman [2016] EWCA Crim 1564 at [49]. 
22  Sentencing remarks of Mr Justice Wilkie in R v Ball 7th October 2015 at [17]. Available online at: 
https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/r-v-ball-sentencing.pdf. 
23  R v Mitchell [2014] EWCA Crim 318. 
24  Discussed further below. 
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2. they are in a position involving a public function which the office holder is obliged to 
exercise in good faith, impartiality or public trust.25 
 
In doing so, they reject two other possibilities: 
 
1. that they are in a position with an institutional or employment link to one of the arms of 
the state; or 
2. a position where the person occupying it has a duty associated with a state function, 
which the public has a significant interest in seeing performed.26 
 
It must be correct to reject the latter two options as the terms used are too vague or would make 
the offence too broad. The first potentially includes every public-sector employee irrespective of 
the function that they hold. It can never have been intended that this would be the scope of the 
offence. The second rejected option is, in essence, a continuance of the status quo and the Law 
Commission note that this has proven problematic, with some arbitrary decisions being made as 
to who is in public office,27 and that the blending of public and private-funded functions means 
that ‘distinctions [would be] drawn between individuals in similar yet different positions that 
would be unworkable in modern life’.28 
  
The two alternatives that are retained as possible tests differ quite significantly in terms of who 
could be caught. The first – a public function exercised pursuant to a state or public power – is 
arguably the narrower of the two. It has the attraction of linking it to the abuse of power. The 
consultation paper noted that a former Attorney-General believed this was the most important 
factor that justified the offence29 and this must be correct. If one looks at the contemporary use 
of the offence,30 it can be seen that most prosecutions relate to a small number of occupations: 
 
1. Politicians.31 
2. Police officers. 
3. Prison officers. 
4. Civilian police and prison staff.32 
5. Court staff.33 
6. Local government employees. 
7. Home Office detention officers (e.g. Borders Agency). 
 
There were, of course, smaller groupings, including members of the Crown Prosecution Service34 
and a small number of military staff. However, this list encompasses the vast majority of people 
                                                 
25  Consultation paper, pp.120-121. 
26  Consultation paper, p.121. 
27  The Law Commission make specific reference to bishops of the Church of England, something that will be 
explored further below. 
28  Consultation paper, p.111. 
29  Consultation paper, p.117 citing the Rt. Hon. Dominic Grieve QC MP.  
30  This is set out extensively in Appendix D of the Issues Paper. 
31  Damien Green MP was investigated, although not charged, for misconduct in public office. At the time of 
writing it has been alleged that the police have been asked to investigate whether Keith Vaz MP has committed 
misconduct in public office. Two MEPs have also been charged with misconduct following allegations 
surrounding their expense claims. There have also been convictions of councillors. 
32  Including PCSOs (police service) and educational and administrative staff employed in the prison service. 
33  No judge has been reported to be investigated for this crime and the staff have primarily included 
administrative staff and jury bailiffs. 
34  Both for conduct that could broadly be summarised as perverting the course of justice.  
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that are covered by the offence. In each case it can be stated they are exercising a power given to 
them by the State. The powers of the police, prison service and Borders Agency are self-
explanatory. They are powers that relate to the enforcement of the law and prevention of crime. 
The powers of politicians, civil servants and local authority employees are probably also well 
understood: they are exercising powers of governance. Whilst there may be some dispute as to 
who fits within these groupings, as a general principle it can be accepted. Similarly the position 
of judges and court staff are self-explanatory. They hold, or facilitate, the power of justice, one of 
the most important powers of the State. Even then, however, there are possible contradictions. 
A barrister employee of the Crown Prosecution Service who leaks information could commit 
MIPO but an independent practising barrister who is instructed by them cannot.35 
 
The advantage of this first proposal is that it does narrow down the pool of people who are 
exercising a power. Where someone is not exercising a public function but is an employee of the 
state then they would not be caught. A good example would be a council ‘lolly-pop’ lady, helping 
children to cross a road outside a school. It would be difficult to argue that this was the exercise 
of a public function and is therefore outside the scope of MIPO. 
 
The second test that the Law Commission propose is perhaps less neat. A person holds a public 
office if ‘they are in a position involving a public function which the office holder is obliged to 
exercise in good faith, impartiality or public trust.’ On the one hand this could seem similar to 
the first test and would certainly capture, for example, the police, politicians, judiciary, civil 
servants etc. but it arguably raises greater uncertainty as to who would be captured by the 
offence and indeed may raise the issue of inconsistent application again. Let us return to the 
example of a Church of England bishop. Under the first test – public power – it is unlikely that a 
bishop would be deemed to be in a public office as administering a religion is not a power of the 
state, although it is arguably (due to establishment) a function of the (English) state. Under the 
second test, the bishop may be included. It would be difficult to argue that a bishop is not 
expected to act in good faith, in an impartial way or according to public trust. Thus a Church of 
England bishop could still be a public officer and yet a Roman Catholic bishop would not. For 
that reason it is submitted that the first definition is more appropriate, especially as it links 
expressly to the concept of power and therefore, by implication, to abuse of power. 
 
Whichever test is adopted, the question then arises who decides whether a person satisfies that 
test? The Law Commission argue there are three possibilities: 
 
1. A statutory test is created, meaning that the courts decide who meets the definition. 
2. The creation of a statutory list that sets out the factors to be considered in determining 
whether a position is a public office. 
3. The creation of a list of particular persons constituting public office.36 
 
In terms of a list there is then the question as to whether it should be a non-exhaustive exemplar 
list (thus allowing for the canon of ejusdem generis) or whether the list should be set out in a 
schedule of the Act, allowing for amendment through secondary legislation. 
 
                                                 
35  The independent barrister is not because they are an independent contractor and neither an office holder nor 
someone receiving money from the state for a state function. The same would undoubtedly be true under the 
Law Commission’s proposals. 
36  Consultation Paper, p.121. 
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Given one of the principal criticisms of MIPO has been uncertainty, it is suggested that any new 
definition should be clear. The most obvious way of doing this is through a list. The Law 
Commission notes that few countries have provided a comprehensive list of those covered by an 
offence and, instead, have tended to create a list of functions.37 There is an attraction to this in 
that functions rarely change but the description of those who do may. So, for example, the 
National Crime Agency has changed its name on numerous occasions, as has the Borders Agency and 
HM Revenue and Customs. Whilst some functions changed, many of their functions did not, but 
the change of name would cause a difficulty if they were included in a list. 
 
A list of functions also avoids the problem that ‘labelling’ posts can have. For example, the label 
‘civil servant’ covers perhaps one of the broadest range of employees. It ranges from the Cabinet 
Secretary to an apprentice working in the post-room of a Whitehall department. There may be 
good reason for covering even the most junior personnel within MIPO – including the person 
who sorts the mail and who copies correspondence to ministers and sells it to lobbyists – but 
there may well be a number of civil servants who should not be covered. For example, a press 
officer of the UK Space Agency is undoubtedly a civil servant but do they need to be subject to 
MIPO (as distinct to other offences)? 
 
HM Council of Judges argue that a list of offices (rather than functions) should be produced,38 
arguing that this brings greater certainty. That is true, but as the Law Commission notes, it brings 
the potential of being overtaken by events as offices change. An obvious retort would be that 
when Parliament changes an office it could, by the same instrument, change the list. However, 
some of the functions are not exercised by Parliamentary power. A good example of this is 
control of agencies. Until 2013 immigration was a matter for the UK Border Agency but this was 
changed by ministerial directive. The functions of the agency were returned to the Home Office 
and a new body – UK Border Force – was created. No statute was required, it was an exercise of 
ministerial power. Therefore the relevant minister would need to (a) recognise the list needed 
changing, (b) decide whether those employed required to be on the list and (c) arrange the 
statutory instrument to come into force at the same time as the ministerial decree.39 Clearly there 
is the potential for this to be missed and thus a list of functions is to be preferred. 
 
Whether a person is a public office holder under current law relates to whether there is a 
‘significant link’ between the holder and a wider public duty. This is perhaps best-encapsulated 
by Sir Brian Leveson P. in R v Mitchell:40  
 
[D]oes the fulfilment of [his] duties represent the fulfilment of one of the responsibility 
of government such as that the public have a significant interest in the discharge of that 
duty which is additional to or beyond an interest in anyone who might be directly 
affected by a serious failure in the performance of that duty?41 
 
The Law Commission argue that this is too vague as ‘significant interest’ decries a definition.42 
They believe that a list of functions would make the offence clearer and it is difficult to argue 
                                                 
37  Consultation Paper, p.123. 
38  Consultation Paper, p.124. 
39  Of course the counter-argument is that ‘civil servant’ could be an office listed and as employees of both the UK 
Borders Agency and UK Border Force were civil servants this would suffice. However, as noted above, ‘civil servant’ 
covers a variety of roles, not all of whom should necessarily fall within the scope of MIPO. 
40  [2014] EWCA Crim 318. 
41  [2014] EWCA Crim 318 at [16]. 
42  Consultation Paper, p.112. 
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against this. However, what test is used to identify public functions? The latter part of the extract 
from Mitchell above provides a clue. In it, Leveson P. differentiated between those who have a 
wider duty to the public, and those who owe a duty to the individual. 
 
Mitchell was a paramedic who was accused of behaving in a (sexually) inappropriate manner 
towards a vulnerable female patient that he was transporting to hospital by ambulance. It was 
thought inappropriate to charge a substantive sex offence and thus he was charged with MIPO. 
He submitted that he did not hold a public office, something rejected by the trial judge, at which 
point he pleaded guilty. 
 
The Court of Appeal quashed his conviction, holding that he was not in public office:  
 
In this case, the nature of the duty undertaken by ambulance paramedics was to treat and 
provide emergency health care to the individual patients for whose care they become 
responsible by reason of the circumstances in which they came into contact with them: it 
is a duty to the individual.43 
  
This can be contrasted with, for example, police officers who owe a duty that is significantly 
wider than the individual who reports being the victim of crime. The Law Commission support 
this logic and state that ‘an important distinction can be made between those who perform 
public functions, including the provision of ‘public’ services, and those who only provide 
services to the public.’44 The distinction here is that the former is much wider than the latter. 
They provide the example of a government minister or civil servant who will be exercising public 
function powers because their performance is directed to the public at large. Similarly, the police 
will be performing a public function as it is not directed towards an individual. However, a nurse 
or teacher would not be performing a public function but rather is providing a service to the 
individual they deal with. Whilst the health service or education authority may be performing a 
public service, the individual teacher or nurse is dealing with an individual and is not exercising 
any powers over the general public. MIPO should only apply to those that have responsibilities 
to the public at large. 
 
BEHAVIOUR THAT SHOULD NOT BE CAUGHT 
 
Another significant criticism advanced by the Law Commission is that too much behaviour is 
included within the offence of MIPO, and that some of this conduct should be left to the civil 
law. The Law Commission believe a considerable amount of misconduct should be treated as a 
regulatory or disciplinary matter, pointing out that this is what happens with many professions.45 
The demarcation between criminal and civil responses is interesting and complicated. It is not 
possible to identify a clear boundary, although that is perhaps unsurprising given that the 
boundary is rarely clear in any other area of the criminal law.46  
 
The Law Commission believes that treating the matter as a regulatory or disciplinary matter 
would be appropriate because this often involves the imposition of sanctions, including 
dismissal, something it argues ‘will often be an adequate social condemnation’.47 The terminology 
                                                 
43  R v Mitchell [2014] EWCA Crim 318 at [19]. 
44  Consultation Paper, p.115. 
45  Doctors and lawyers perhaps being the most obvious examples.  
46   For a general discussion see the introductory pages of D. Ormerod and K. Laird Smith & Hogan’s Criminal Law 
(14th Edn, 2015: Oxford. OUP). 
47  Consultation Paper, p.81. 
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here is interesting. What does ‘social condemnation’ mean? Certainly, a victim may be satisfied 
that wrongful action has led to an officer losing their job, but it is equally possible that they may 
believe that the loss of employment is insufficient. Also, there may be little sense of public 
condemnation. One of the principles behind criminal law is that (ordinarily) it is discharged in 
public so that the public are reassured that there are consequences for those who break the rules. 
Regulatory matters will not necessarily be held in public. Whilst the regulators for doctors and 
lawyers publish their findings, not all will. The dismissal of an employee is rarely public 
knowledge and therefore there is a material difference between the civil and criminal law in terms 
of condemnation. Of course, by itself this is not a justification for criminalisation but it is worth 
questioning whether the belief of social condemnation is necessarily correct. 
 
The Law Commission believes that ‘seriousness’ separates the criminal law from the civil law. It 
concedes that in many instances, the misconduct could constitute a wrong or cause harm, but 
believes that only where it involves serious harm can criminal law be justified. Whilst this is a 
logical statement, it is controversial in its application, particularly in respect of sexual 
misconduct. Setting aside those cases where there is the exploitation of a vulnerable person (as 
that will be discussed later), the principal concern is that a sexual relationship can cause harm not 
to the individual but to the public and the public service employed by them. The Law 
Commission refer to R v Cosford48 where a nurse employed by the Prison Service engaged in 
(consensual) sexual activities with a prisoner. The argument for criminalising Cosford is not that 
the relationship was exploitative, but that it undermined prison discipline and the proper 
functioning of the prison regime. Prison is about the punishment of those who break the rules 
and (arguably) correcting this behaviour. A sexual relationship between those employed to 
enforce prison discipline and those who are incarcerated undermines public trust. The same 
could be said of R v Belton49 which concerned a member of the independent monitoring board.50 
Members of monitoring boards are tasked by society to ensure that prisons are being run 
properly and that prisoners are safe. A sexual relationship between the visitor and prisoner 
undermines this scheme: it casts doubt on the impartiality of the regime and causes questions to 
be asked about whether the report can be trusted. 
 
Does the fact that sexual relationships such as these cause harm to the public interest justify the 
imposition of a criminal offence? The Law Commission does not believe so.51 It argues that the 
‘wrong is primarily disciplinary rather than criminal. For a prison officer to enter into a sexual 
relationship with an inmate is no doubt very reprehensible, but in most cases the solution lies in 
dismissal’.52 This does raise an interesting question in the examples of Cosford and Belton above.  
Whilst both can, of course, be dismissed, only Cosford was remunerated. Thus Cosford will 
suffer financial detriment but Belton will not. Members are unpaid and therefore do they suffer 
any sanction beyond the revocation of their status? The fact that they are not remunerated is not 
reason to impose criminal liability but it does demonstrate that, in the absence of the criminal 
law, there could be very different outcomes to exactly the same conduct. 
 
It has to be questioned whether the behaviour in Cosford and Beltson could be considered 
disciplinary in nature. Sexual relationships in such circumstances impact on public trust. Whilst it 
can be argued that this conduct is no different to situations involving non-public office holders, 
                                                 
48  [2013] EWCA Crim 466; Consultation Paper, p.85. 
49  [2010] EWCA Crim 2857. 
50  Established under s.6, Prisons Act 1952. They are lay persons who inspect the safety and security of the prison, 
including meeting prisoners. 
51  Whilst they suggest creating an offence relating to sexual  
52  Consultation Paper, p.89. 
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e.g. doctors and lawyers,53 there is a difference. Office holders are given additional powers by the 
state. They are given these powers in exchange for their proper use and discharge. The conduct 
offends against these principles. What of Belton?  Can it be said that she had additional powers? 
Yes. They may not be as obvious as the prison officer, but she has the powers to enter a prison 
in a way that no other lay person does. She has the power to report abuses and for that conduct 
to be taken seriously. If a member was to allege that staff X had acted inappropriately, the Prison 
Service would take that seriously and investigate that person in a detailed way. This could lead to 
suspension and personal consequences for the staff member but the investigation would occur 
because they need to take such reports seriously. The public surely expects that the abuse of the 
state’s powers warrants punishment.  
 
Before leaving this issue, it should be noted that the Law Commission have concerns over two 
aspects of behaviour that are currently within MIPO but which they do not seek to address in 
the paper. The first relates to data protection. The issues paper notes there are a considerable 
number of cases where public servants (most notably police officers) have accessed ‘confidential 
information’ in improper circumstances.54 However, the Law Commission believe that this 
should be dealt with separately as part of a review of offences relating to official data, rather than 
remaining within MIPO. 
 
The second issue relates to sexual misconduct. A considerable number of cases of MIPO relates 
to sexually problematic behaviour.55 As noted already, the Law Commission believe that some 
sexual misconduct should be dealt with as a disciplinary issue. They concede that not all can, 
however, and concentrate on behaviour that is exploitation. They make the (perfectly reasonable) 
point that sexual exploitation is not restricted to public offices, and that a separate offence under 
the Sexual Offences Ac 2003 may be more appropriate.56 In this article it is not possible to address 
this point, but it is conceded that it is perhaps inappropriate that sexual exploitation cannot be 
dealt with in the same way irrespective of the ‘status’ of the exploiter. 
 
UNFAIRNESS 
The third principal criticism of MIPO is that it is used to treat public servants more harshly than 
would happen for the same conduct committed by a private individual, something that could be 
considered unfair. Part of the argument relates to the point above about conduct that is only 
criminal because the individual is a public officer. The second part of the argument is that MIPO 
is used in preference to statutory offences, particularly in those circumstances where the 
statutory penalty is considered relatively light. 
 
The basis of this argument is that Parliament has prohibited specific conduct through the 
creation of statutory offences but that prosecutors are choosing instead to prosecute MIPO, 
believing that this provides more appropriate punishment. Perhaps the classic example of this is 
in respect of inappropriate accessing or disclosing of data. The issues paper provides several 
examples where a police officer accesses the Police National Computer to find information he is 
not entitled to and, in some cases, passes this information to a third-party.57 This is classic 
behaviour that is capable of being prosecuted either under the Data Protection Act 199858 or the 
                                                 
53  Consultation Paper, p.88. 
54  Issues paper, Appendix D. 
55  Issues Paper, Appendix D. An analysis of this appendix suggests that approximately one-third of all cases where 
MIPO was charged related to sexual impropriety. 
56  Consultation Paper, p.104. 
57  Appendix D, Issues Paper.  
58  s.55, Data Protection Act 1998. Triable only summarily, the maximum sentence is a fine. 
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Computer Misuse Act 1990.59 Why, therefore, should it be prosecuted under MIPO? Is it because 
MIPO is a common-law offence and thus punishable more severely? If so, does that contradict 
the will of Parliament? 
 
Arguably not. Parliament must be aware of the existence of MIPO. Therefore, when it passes 
laws such as the Data Protection Act 1998 and Computer Misuse Act 1990 it could have chosen to 
disapply MIPO to such offences. Doing so would be simplicity itself. Admittedly there were few 
cases of MIPO in the 1990s so perhaps this is a slightly weaker argument but when the use of 
MIPO rose significantly, Parliament had numerous opportunities to reform it if it believed 
MIPO was unfair. 
 
It is far from clear that it is unfair to prosecute in these circumstances. HM Council of Judges, in 
their response to the issues paper, stated that using MIPO in these circumstances is appropriate 
and should be used where the sentence under a substantive offence would be inappropriate.60 
Critics would argue that this is wrong and if Parliament intended a more severe sentence to be 
passed, it would set the maximum sentence accordingly. It could even, for example, provide 
alternative sentences depending on the factual circumstances of the offence. For example, it 
could say “where the offence is committed by a public servant, the maximum sentence shall be 
x”. However, that would be cumbersome and would require several statutes to be amended.  
 
There are two principal difficulties with the suggestion that it is wrong to use MIPO in this way. 
The first is that there are numerous examples within English law of conduct that can be 
prosecuted in different ways.61 Thus MIPO is not unique in doing this. The second, but most 
important argument, is that wrongful conduct by a public servant may be materially different 
from the same conduct by a private citizen. The argument for retaining MIPO is that if we 
provide additional powers to the state, we can expect higher standards and, therefore, graver 
penalties for breaching those powers. Consider two similar situations: 
 
A is an employee of a bank. He looks up a former school-friend (X) on the computer to 
see whether he is earning more than A because A has always been jealous of X. 
 
B is a police officer. He accesses the Police National Computer to find the location of Y, 
the man who is having an affair with his wife. 
 
Whilst both are examples of data protection breaches, the second would seem more serious. 
Arguably both A and B are in positions of trust (defined in the broader sense) in that we expect 
our details to be kept private, but we can expect higher standards from those who we ask to 
guard us, to protect us and to uphold the laws. The second example is also the deliberate use of a 
public database and therefore could be seen as an abuse of the privileges given to state officials. 
This is perhaps further strengthened if ‘public officer’ becomes, as has been suggested, linked to 
the granting of powers from the state. MIPO would become an offence about the abuse of those 
powers and this makes it materially different from situations involving private actors. 
                                                 
59  s.1, Computer Misuse Act 1990. Whilst R v Bignall [1998] 1 Cr App R 1 cast doubt on its applicability, the House of 
Lords decision in R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Government of the USA [2000] 2 AC 216 
has led to it being a more appropriate offence. Triable either-way, the offence is punishable by a maximum 
sentence of two years’ imprisonment. 
60  Consultation Paper, p.198. 
61  Most of the non-fatal offences regime is subject to overlap. An obvious overlap (albeit one that has been heavily 
criticised) is that which exists between s.1, Malicious Communications Act 1988 and s.127, Communications Act 2003 




Whilst this is an example that relates to a minor offence – data protection – the principle applies 
in a wider way. It is therefore difficult to suggest that it is somehow unfair that MIPO exists. 
 
THE REPLACEMENT OFFENCES 
The Law Commission believes that MIPO should be replaced by one, or both, of two offences. 
These are designed to address the criticism discussed above, particularly by making the 
particulars of the offence clearer, and by limiting the people and behaviour that will be subject to 
the offence(s). 
 
The first offence is based on the breach of a duty, and it seeks to push those who breach a duty 
to protect the public from harm. The second offence is based on corruption, and is designed to 
punish those who seek to benefit from misconduct linked to their duties. 
 
BREACH OF A DUTY MODEL 
The first replacement offence proposed is based on breach of a (public) duty. In essence, the 
model requires the following elements: 
 
1. A public office holder must have a duty to prevent harm. 
2. They must breach that duty. 
3. The breach must either cause harm or have the potential to cause harm to a specified 
level. 
4. The breach must occur with the necessarily fault element. 
 
Public officer with relevant duty 
It will be remembered that the definition of ‘public office’ will already change as a result of the 
wider reforms, but the Law Commission believes that not all public office holders should be 
subject to this new offence. Instead, they intend to limit the offence to those who owe a duty to 
keep the public safe, as it is thought that it is this element – either causing, or failing to prevent, 
harm – that is most deserving of punishment. 
 
They propose that a person holds a relevant duty if: 
 
1. they occupy a position that carries with it powers of physical coercion, or 
2. they occupy a position that includes a duty of protection. 
 
The first is perhaps the easiest to explain and understand. The state gives certain powers to those 
it wishes to enforce the law. This can include the right of arrest, the right of detention and other 
regulatory functions. These powers are accompanied with the right to use physical violence to 
exercise these rights62 and therefore it is right that they should be held to account when such 
powers are improperly used. 
 
An important subsection of this first duty is that the Law Commission argue that those with 
coercive powers also have a commensurate duty to prevent harm. They cite the example of R v 
Driver63 which concerned a police officer who did not adequately check the well-being of two 
intoxicated persons. Clearly this should be within any new offence as those public officers who 
                                                 
62  Most notably, s.3, Criminal Law Act 1967. 
63  Unreported first-instance case but referenced in Appendix D of the Issues Paper. 
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held the duty identified above are paid to ensure the public are safe and well. An omission to do 
so must be within the offence.  
 
The proposal to include those possessing powers of coercion is unproblematic and indeed it 
would have been more worrying had such persons not been included. The second group of 
persons who are within the scope of the offence are those who owe a duty of protection. This 
includes, for example, those who have a duty to keep the peace but do not have powers of 
coercion (for example, Police Community Support Officers who do not have any formal right of 
arrest,64 and certain positions within prisons). More than this, however, they recognise that some 
will have a duty to protect the vulnerable. There is undoubtedly an overlap in that those within 
the first category will automatically have the duty to protect the vulnerable, but they are not 
alone in having this duty and thus the second category is important. 
 
Of course, the question then immediately becomes who is vulnerable? The Law Commission 
notes that this is not an easy question to answer as there is no definition of vulnerability. 
Ultimately the Law Commission suggest that vulnerability could be defined in the same way as in 
the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006. Section 59 of that Act defines vulnerability in a series 
of ways including by their accommodation status, the fact that they are detained, under the 
supervision of the courts, are under health care etc. The list would cover most of the 
circumstances when an adult is considered vulnerable. There is no point in re-inventing the 
wheel and thus s.59 is generally appropriate. However, by itself, it would not cover everyone in a 
vulnerable position. Section 59 refers to adults and not children. How then should the new 
offence apply to those who owe a duty to children? One possibility is that those under 18 could 
be deemed to be intrinsically vulnerable, although politically that may cause some eyebrows to be 
raised. Extending s.59 to children for these purposes (i.e. replicating the list but extending it to 
children) would not assist as there are some obvious omissions, most notably education. One 
possibility would be to use the list used in the Sexual Offences Act 2003 which governs the abuse 
of trust65 but this list is itself problematic in some contexts, not least because it is aimed at sexual 
offending. So, for example, whilst it refers to an educational establishment, it does not make 
reference to apprenticeships or traineeships. The growth of apprenticeships in the public sector 
certainly makes it conceivable that a public office holder may have management responsibility 
for an apprentice and who could abuse this for their own ends. Section 21 also refers to 
accommodation in hospital but s.59 refers to the provision of any health care, so s.21 would 
mean that fewer situations were covered, potentially putting people at risk. 
 
There is no doubt that those who look after the vulnerable should be within the scope of the 
new offence. However, there needs to be a better definition of ‘vulnerable’. The two options put 
forward have difficulties and neither would adequately define ‘vulnerable’. Defining vulnerability 
is extremely difficult with most definitions receiving some criticism.66 The Law Commission 
believe that statutory tests bring greater certainty, but one cannot help wonder whether this is an 
issue best left to the courts. The statute could say the offence applies to a public officer who has 
a duty to protect the vulnerable, but leave the courts to decide who is vulnerable. This does 
arguably introduce a degree of uncertainty but it would be modest as most vulnerable 
relationships are obvious. Creating a definitive test for these purposes would be difficult and 
arguably would go no further than if it were left to the courts. 
 
                                                 
64  Although they do have a limited power to detain (Schedule 4, Police Reform Act 2002). 
65  Section 21, Sexual Offences Act 2003. 
66  Something discussed in the consultation paper, pp.140-141. 
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Breach of the Duty 
Once the duty has been established, then it is necessary to show breach. The Law Commission 
spends a considerable period of time on aspects of this but this section will be relatively brief. 
The Commission discusses whether breach should include omissions and little will be said on 
this because it is inarguable that omissions should not be included. The decision in R v Dytham67 
continues to demonstrate its need. 
 
A more interesting question regarding the breach is what acts or omissions should be within the 
offence? Under the current offence, any misconduct by a public officer leaves him open to 
prosecution, not just matters connected to his duty. The Law Commission believes that this is 
wrong and note that this may mean that a person could be prosecuted for harassing a colleague, 
something that would ordinarily be dealt with as a disciplinary/employment issue if the person 
was not a public officer. Quite whether this would ever be prosecuted is perhaps more difficult 
to ascertain but it is conceded that there is at least the potential for this to happen, which may 
seem unwise. The Law Commission are particularly concerned about MIPO being used to 
circumvent rules on fraud in respect of expenses.68 This is a good point and certainly outside of 
what most people would probably consider the mischief of MIPO, which is to safeguard the 
public, or the public’s trust, from the abuse of officials. 
 
Limiting the offence to conduct within the duty would be appropriate, and would partly address 
the criticism that too much behaviour is criminalised by MIPO. Yet at the same time, serious 
breaches that risk harm to the public will remain within the scope of the offence. 
 
Harm 
Perhaps the more controversial aspect of the proposed model is that a breach of the duty must 
be to a certain level. The Law Commission talk of ‘serious consequences’ which they initially 
define as one of two harms: 
 
1. Death or serious injury (including psychiatric illness). 
2. False imprisonment. 
 
The harms need not be caused, it would suffice that the breach leads to a risk that such harms 
will occur (although there must be an awareness of the risk). This is justified in the context of 
this offence because the office holders who are within the scope of this offence have a duty to 
protect. Thus criminalising breaches where there is a risk of serious consequences will mean that 
the duty becomes that the office holder should not endanger the victim, i.e. cause or allow the 
victim or victims to be placed in a position whereby the consequences happen or could happen. 
 
Death or serious injury would be an obvious harm but the question of threshold must be raised. 
The Law Commission argues the offence should only apply to serious harms and thus adopted 
that approach to physical violence. Serious injury will be given its usual meaning, i.e. the 
equivalent of grievous bodily harm. However, that means the threshold for this offence is high. 
Whilst the Law Commission present a number of examples of how the offence could be justified 
in circumstances where, for example, an office holder neglects to safeguard a person who dies,69 
there is less consideration about the justification for exempting lesser injuries from the offence. 
 
                                                 
67  [1979] QB 722. 
68  Consultation Paper, p.163.  
69  Consultation paper, p.157. 
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Whilst it is conceded that the Law Commission are trying to suggest that MIPO should not be 
used for trivial offences (although it could be argued that is the role of prosecutorial discretion), 
the Commission has arguably, in this section at least, lost sight of what the purpose of the 
offence is. The actual level of injury inflicted is less relevant than the circumstances in which the 
injury was caused or risked. Let us take an example: 
 
D is a police officer. He stands and watches X, a colleague, punch V several times in the 
stomach and once in the face. V suffers some bruising and a split lip. 
 
X could be prosecuted for a non-fatal offence but D probably cannot or would not, not least 
because the law of complicity regarding someone standing in silence is questionable.70 However, 
the more obvious crime in this situation would be MIPO. This is a clear example of when 
current MIPO would currently be used. It may be chosen in respect of X to provide greater 
sentencing powers (as discussed above). In respect of D, standing by and watching the assault 
without intervening would be classed as a neglect of duty in the same way as in Dytham. Thus 
there would be no need to rely on complicity, as D would commit the act as a principal. 
However, under the Law Commission proposals, this type of conduct would no longer be within 
MIPO as it does not constitute serious injury. That must be wrong. In a moment, it will be noted 
that false imprisonment is considered a serious harm because the deprivation of liberty is 
significant. Why? Because it is an abuse of the power of the state. The same is true of the 
example above. The injuries are less important than the fact that the powers of the state were 
abused to cause the injury. This applies as much to D – who should have stopped, arrested or 
reported X to his superiors – as it does to X. Any violence committed by a public officer who 
has a duty through powers of physical coercion is an abuse of the authority of the state and 
should be criminalised through MIPO. 
 
The Law Commission include psychiatric harm, which is important, although the law has a 
relatively high threshold for psychiatric harm and if there is a requirement for serious harm then 
this would mean serious psychiatric harm, which limits it further. They provide the example of a 
social worker knowingly allowing a 16-year-old child to be removed from a child care home to 
be repeatedly sexually abused. The logic is that prolonged sexual abuse would cause (or risks 
causing) serious psychiatric harm and thus the social worker could be culpable. Is this true 
though? It could be read as meaning that culpability is based on the resilience of the victim. Also, 
whilst it is clear that repeated sexual abuse may lead to serious psychiatric (rather than 
psychological) harm, it does not follow that a single instance necessarily will, particularly where 
they are being groomed. Yet, knowingly allowing a child to be removed to facilitate abuse must 
be an example of when MIPO should be committed irrespective of what harm the child suffers. 
Social workers (and others) are there to protect children and knowingly allowing them to be used 
for sexual gratification must be misconduct in public office worthy of punishment.71 
 
False imprisonment 
The Law Commission suggest that false imprisonment should be considered a serious harm that 
would suffice for this offence. The Commission are undoubtedly correct to argue this, given the 
                                                 
70  R v Coney (1882) LR 8 QBD 534 cf. R v Clarkson [1971] 3 All ER 344. It is possible that a failure to arrest would 
be more relevant following the ruling in R v Dytham [1979] QB 722. 
71  Whilst it is possible that such acts could be caught by s.14, Sexual Offences Act 2003 (arranging or facilitating the 
commission of a child sex offence) it would depend on D intending that the sex act took place. Where, for 
example, D did not care whether V was being let out of the care home for sexual exploitation or other 
purposes, it is likely s.14 could not be committed whereas MIPO undoubtedly could. 
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importance society attaches to liberty, but it does raise again an oddity in respect of violence. Let 
us take the following example: 
 
D, a police officer, receives a complaint that two 15-year-olds are causing nuisance 
outside an elderly person’s house. He arrives and sees X and Y, who he knows. He 
decides that the paperwork will be too onerous to arrest them, especially as the 
magistrates would not take their case particularly seriously. He decides instead to “teach 
them a lesson” and therefore he locks them in a shed and says he will be back for them 
later. He returns three hours later and lets them go. 
 
Quite rightly the Law Commission would consider this to be an example of when MIPO could 
be used. A police officer has arbitrarily detained a child and this can only be seen as an abuse of 
the powers of the state. However is it more harmful than if D gives them both a ‘clip around the 
ear’ to teach them a lesson? What if X and Y were aged 11? An assault by a police officer in such 
circumstances could be as traumatic as being locked in a shed and yet this would not constitute 
MIPO and would presumably only constitute the (minor) offence of common assault. Yet both 




Whilst the Law Commission argue that death/serious injury and false imprisonment should 
constitute serious harms, they question whether two further harms should also be included. 
These are: 
 
1. Serious harms to public order and safety. 
2. Serious harms to the administration of justice. 
 
Public order & safety are important aspects of the duty imposed on those with coercive powers. 
It is important that the public are protected but it is difficult to conceive of a situation where a 
serious harm to public order or safety is created that does not also create the risk of death or 
injury. 
 
Harms to the administration of justice is more interesting as that is certainly not linked to the 
concept of physical violence. It is about the subversion of the justice system. Of course, one 
issue that would then need to be answered is how MIPO can be differentiated from offences 
relating to perverting justice. The common-law offence of perverting the course of justice is a 
similarly wide offence although it does appear to be directed towards conduct that is seen to be 
interfering with the natural course of justice. There may be circumstances when conduct could 
undermine public confidence in the justice system and yet not necessarily interfere with the 
course of justice. The Law Commission discusses the case of Elaine Hemblade, a jury officer 
who was tasked to oversee jury selection. Hemblade ensured that her neighbour and son were 
selected to sit on a jury panel. It would be difficult to argue that this interfered with the natural 
course of justice because the neighbour and son could still have sat through the trial and 
executed their jury oath conscientiously. However, it would undoubtedly undermine the 
confidence of the justice system if discovered. Presumably, the same would be true of a jury 
officer who ensured that a black person was never called to a jury panel.  The public would 
expect a jury to be randomly selected and thus it would have its confidence undermined by such 
an approach. However, proving that this interfered with the ordinary course of justice for a case 




The Law Commission discuss the judicial oath but it is difficult to think of circumstances when a 
judge does something that could cause harm to the justice system that did not also act as an 
interference in the course of justice. One possible example could involve administrative duties: 
 
D is the resident judge of Anywhere Crown Court. Whenever a defendant is a member of a 
particular club he ensures that it is tried by Judge X who, he believes, gives lenient 
sentences. 
 
It would be difficult to see how this could constitute perverting the course of justice (as the 
sentence may be lawful, it is just that judge X, for example, has more faith in non-custodial 
sentences than another judge) but it undoubtedly undermines the justice system. However, the 
chances of such a case arising is extremely small. It is perhaps for this reason that care has to be 
taken to separate out the theoretical instances a crime could occur from its realistic prospects. 
 
Harm to the administration of justice should be within the scope of the offence. However, it 
must be questioned whether we need to specifically identify the harms. It has been seen that 
violence has its problems as does administering justice. Public order & safety are probably 
subsumed within violence but it may not be the most obvious link. Perhaps the solution is not to 
list harms but rather require the breach to be serious. Whilst it is conceded that this could be 
considered to introduce a degree of uncertainty into the offence, it is a measured risk. The courts 
are already left to decide whether offences are serious,72 and in the context of manslaughter by 
gross negligence, are already asked whether a breach is sufficiently serious to warrant 
criminalisation. It is not immediately clear why a court could not be left with the same test for 
this offence? It would probably ensure that the trivial cases the Law Commission is concerned 
about are weeded out but allowing strong cases to proceed. 
 
Mental Fault Requirement 
The Law Commission argue that the mens rea should be recklessness.73 In so doing, they reject the 
suggestion that it should be a crime of negligence or one requiring ulterior intent. Ulterior intent 
should be rejected because it could make it too restrictive but also because it could criminalise 
someone who intends a risk and yet does not create that risk.74 
 
Negligence is also rightly rejected. Whilst negligence has begun to creep into the criminal law, it 
is something that should be resisted so far as possible. Negligence is a standard that is best 
thought of as a civil wrong. It will be remembered that misconduct in public office is also a tort75 
and so where a person discharges their duty negligently, they could be accountable through civil 
action.76 
 
It has been noted that a separate mental fault requirement is that D must be aware of the risks 
that are created by the breach. That said, the Law Commission proposes recklessness will suffice 
and thus the question is whether they know that the circumstances might give rise to the serious 
consequences. This is partly to take account of those who wilfully fail to act when they should 
realise that there may be a risk of serious consequences. The Law Commission refers to R v 
                                                 
72  When deciding whether an injury constitutes Actual Bodily Harm or Grievous Bodily Harm. 
73  Consultation paper, p.168. 
74  Consultation paper, p.169. 
75  Where it is known as malfeasance, misfeasance or nonfeasance in public office. 
76  Or their employer could be depending on their status and whether vicarious liability applies. 
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Driver77 as a good example. In Driver a police officer did not give adequate attention to two 
people who were drunk. He had not realised that they were close to death but that was because 
he did not check their status. If intent / direct knowledge was required, then Driver would have 
needed to intend for the victims to die or be seriously injured. This is unlikely. Instead, it is more 
likely that Driver decided that they were ‘just drunks’ and that checking their condition in detail 
would generate paperwork. He undoubtedly realised that there was a risk in leaving them on a 
cold night but did not care. Clearly this should be within MIPO and the Law Commission 
proposal will ensure that this occurs. 
 
An interesting question is whether D needs to know that he is a public officer? The Law 
Commission suggests that it would be odd to impose liability if a person did not know, or have 
any cause to suspect, that he was in public office,78 although a number of cases have turned on 
whether a person did, in fact, hold public office79 which suggests it is not unreasonable to query 
this. However it is slightly more nuanced than this. Whilst D need not know whether, in law, he 
holds a public office, he should know the factual circumstances that lead to the office. For 
example, a police officer will know that they are a police officer and that they have a duty to 
uphold the law, safeguard the public and protect individuals. Similarly, a member of the Border 
Force will know that they have coercive powers and that they have a duty to enforce the law. Of 
course, if Parliament did create a statutory list of public office holders then it will become easier 
for people to know that they are subject to this offence. 
 
CORRUPTION-BASED MODEL 
The second offence that the Law Commission put forward is an offence that has corruption at 
its heart. They note that one of the mischiefs of MIPO is to deter public servants from abusing 
their position for personal gain,80 which must be correct. The second proposed offence is 
designed to meet this mischief and it could be introduced alongside the previous offence, not 
least because they address subtlety different things. 
 
Is an offence of corruption required? Arguably corruption is already dealt with in a number of 
ways, including bribery. The Law Commission do not believe that their proposal will undermine 
the new bribery offence, in part because they believe the matter can be dealt with through 
prosecutorial guidelines.81 It has to be questioned whether this faith is necessarily well-placed. 
There are numerous examples where there is overlap between different offences and the CPS 
choose one offence or the other. Whilst there will clearly be reasons in some cases why one form 
has been chosen rather than others, in other cases it is less than clear why a particular charge is 
preferred.82 
 
Where the Law Commission believes there is an obvious overlap is in respect of the offence 
under s.26, Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015. This prohibits the corrupt or improper exercise of 
police powers. Section 26 is an unusual offence in that it was introduced almost from nowhere. 
There had been no public call for s.26 and instead it was a political response to a belief that the 
                                                 
77  Consultation paper, p.137. Unreported first-instance. 
78  Consultation Paper, p.151. 
79  R v Ball (unreported) and R v Cosford [2013] EWCA Crim 466  
80  Consultation Paper, p.96 and see also Chapter 6 of the consultation. 
81  Consultation Paper, p.175. 
82  Or indeed why both are charged. In R v Patel [2012] EWCA Crim 3075 the defendant pleaded guilty to both 
bribery and MIPO. Presumably both were preferred because it allowed greater sentencing possibilities for the 
court to take account of the breach of trust, but could this not be done by treating breach of the public’s trust 
as an aggravating factor? 
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police were acting inappropriately in certain circumstances. However, it is less clear that the 
conduct of the police warranted an offence simply for them, even taking into account the 
political situation of the time.83 There are a number of public servants who could act 
inappropriately but s.26 only applied to the police. The Law Commission suggests that s.26 
could be repealed if option 2 is adopted and it is submitted that there is little merit in keeping 
such a narrow offence. 
 
What then do the Law Commission propose? It suggests: 
 
1. A public officer abuses his position, power or authority. 
2. Thus abuse is through exercising that position, power or authority for the purpose of 
achieving 
a. a benefit to himself or herself; or 
b. a benefit or a detriment for another person. 
3. That this abuse was seriously improper. 
 
Public Office 
It will be remembered that the breach of duty model would only apply to a subset of public 
offices. This was, in part, a response to the Law Commission’s view that too many people were 
subject to MIPO. The common-law offence of MIPO did not differentiate between offices, 
meaning that anyone holding a public office was at risk of prosecution for behaviour that would 
not otherwise be criminal. Whilst a limitation on the number of offices could be justified for the 
breach of duty model, the same cannot be true of a corruption-based model. The mischief 
behind this offence is a public officer abusing his or her position for gain and thus it is important 
that it applies to all public offices, defined under the new (proposed) test. 
 
Abuses his or her position 
It will be remembered that a criticism of the current offence of MIPO is that it applies to any 
misconduct perpetrated by an office holder irrespective of whether such conduct falls within 
their office. This proposed offence would not have this problem. The wording is clear that the 
breach is of their duty, power or responsibility.  
 
Two examples are provided by the Law Commission. The first concerns an immigration officer 
who does not grant access to the UK without receiving a bribe. This abuse of his power – 
denying access to the United Kingdom – is clearly linked to his position as a member of the 
Border Force. The example is also interesting because it concerns bribery and the example given 
would be covered by s.2, Bribery Act 2010. It will be remembered that the Law Commission 
argued that this proposed offence would not undermine bribery but the example they use is 
perhaps a good example of how MIPO overlaps with statutory offences. 
 
The second example is the case of R v W84 which concerned improper use of a credit card by a 
police officer. They note that this would not be caught by the revised offence as the misconduct 
does not arise from his office. This must be correct. The fact that W was a public servant does 
not mean that he should be punished differently. The conduct constitutes fraud and whilst it is 
conceded that the additional expenditure came from the public purse, this cannot by itself be a 
justification for treating W differently. If a private contractor committed fraud by, for example, 
                                                 
83  This was at the time of the Hillsborough inquiry and also the furore that erupted over the conduct of 
undercover police officers. 
84  [2010] EWCA Crim 372; Consultation Paper, p.178. 
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artificially over-charging a public-sector agency the same result would have been achieved – the 
public purse would suffer a (wrongful) reduction – but only where it was a public office holder 
would MIPO be available, something not tenable. 
 
Benefit or detriment 
As was discussed above, this option is based on corruption and this has been defined as accruing 
a benefit for oneself or another or causing detriment to another. At first sight this, would appear 
uncontroversial. Where a person seeks to exploit their position to benefit themselves or another, 
then this would be a paradigm of corruption. The Law Commission is, however, silent as to what 
‘benefit’ and ‘detriment’ means. Will it include intangible benefits (goodwill, promotion 
prospects etc) or only those that can be quantified in a propriety way? If the definitions are 
drawn too broadly, there is a danger that anyone could show some form of benefit or detriment 
and the courts will become confused over the nature and purpose of the offence. However, if 
they are defined too narrowly (eg by being tied to financial benefits or detriment) then some 




As with the breach of duty model, the Law Commission does not believe that any wrongful 
decision taken for benefit or detriment should be culpable and instead they suggest a seriousness 
threshold is imposed. Unlike the approach adopted in respect of the first model, the Law 
Commission recommend that ‘serious’ should not be defined and instead it should be left to the 
courts. This is undoubtedly a pragmatic solution, not least because it is difficult to define 
seriousness in this context. However, it does raise the question why the same approach cannot 
be adopted for the breach of duty model. It will be remembered that this has quite specific 
definitions of seriousness but which may leave gaps, particularly where violence is involved. 
Adopting this alternative approach of leaving it to the tribunal of fact would be preferable.  
 
Fault requirement 
What should the mens rea be? Again, this option appears simpler. The most logical fault 
requirement is that of ‘purpose’. As the Law Commission recognises, this is different from 
intention or knowledge. Whilst knowledge would be overly restrictive, in that person would need 
to have direct knowledge that their actions would cause a benefit to himself or another or 
detriment to another, intent is arguably wider, not least because it would ordinarily include 
oblique intention. ‘Purpose’ however would seem more restricted in that it must be shown D 
acted for corrupt purposes. What of the situation where there is more than one purpose? 
Statutes have in the past allowed for ‘one of the purposes’85 and this perhaps makes sense in this 
context as that better encapsulates our understanding of what the word ‘corruption’ means. 
 
The Law Commission do not believe that a person should know that they are, in law, a public 
office holder although they should know the factual circumstances that would lead to a court 
deciding that they are a public office holder.86 Of course, if ‘public office’ is defined through a 
statutory list then a person should know this. 
 
                                                 
85  See, for example, s.1(1), Malicious Communications Act 1988. 
86  Consultation Paper, p.186. 
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The Law Commission also concludes that there is no need to prove that D knew that he had a 
duty not to be corrupt.87 Again, this must be correct. It would be odd to prove this since a 
person who is aware that he exercises a public function such as to make him a public office 
holder should did not know that this meant he should not act corruptly.   
 
CONCLUSION 
As the fall-out from Operation Elveden showed, MIPO is a controversial offence. There is little 
doubt that some form of offence is required to ensure that those who hold authority over us, can 
be held to account either for actions that harm us, or for not protecting us. However, concerns 
have been raised that too much conduct is the subject of MIPO and that too many people are 
within the scope of the offence. 
 
As a common-law offence, its scope and limits have been set by the courts, largely when dealing 
with individual cases. This has meant that there has been little opportunity to think about why 
the offence exists and what conduct should be within it. The fact that some public servants can 
be convicted of something when a private citizen cannot is not by itself problematic in all cases. 
Public servants may be given additional powers or have additional responsibilities, for which they 
should be held to account. However, the scope of who is included and the limits of the offence 
should be identifiable. In other cases, e.g. sexual exploitation, it is more difficult to understand 
why a public servant can be liable but an employer cannot. Is this a fault of MIPO or a fault of 
sexual offences law? Arguably both, and yet the common-law is impotent to advance sexual 
offences law. 
 
The Law Commission has produced a well thought-out consultation paper that poses difficult 
questions for the law. As has been noted in this article, it is not easy to change an offence that 
dates back to the 13th century. Whatever they do will be subject to debate and criticism, but the 
paper should be broadly welcomed and the principal recommendation to replace MIPO with 
two new offences should be accepted, although both models will require further work. What 
those offences will look like will undoubtedly be based on the responses to the consultation 
paper and it will be interesting to see how the nuances of the common-law offence will find their 
way into its statutory replacements. To that extent, the final report of the Law Commission will 
be as interesting a read as the consultation paper that precedes it. 
  
 
                                                 
87  Consulation Paper, p..187. 
